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ABSTRACT 
Using a sample of male and female workers from the 1992 Employment in Britain survey we 
estimate a generalised grouped zero-inflated Poisson regression model of employees’ self-
reported lateness.  Reflecting theoretical predictions from both psychology and economics, 
lateness is modelled as a function of incentives, the monitoring of and sanctions for lateness 
within the workplace, job satisfaction and attitudes to work.  Various aspects of workplace 
incentive and disciplinary policies turn out to affect lateness, however, once these are 
controlled for, an important role for job satisfaction remains. 
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1.  Introduction 
Labour productivity depends in part on the commitment of workers.  Commitment, or the lack 
thereof, drives worker behaviour in ways which can impact on output and hence firm 
profitability.  Recent research on worker behaviour has studied worker absenteeism ( Barmby 
et al., 1995), the intensity of work effort in any hour on the job (Green, 2001) and quits 
(Clark, 2001).  A relatively neglected aspect of worker commitment is punctuality, yet it is 
clear that late arrival at work imposes direct and indirect costs on the employer.  As well as 
the direct cost of lost output and the knock-on effects of lateness in integrated production 
systems, late arrival can be viewed as a "withdrawal behaviour" which is a correlate of, or 
precursor to, shirking, absenteeism or turnover.  Just as employers invest in personnel policies 
intended to reduce absenteeism and turnover or to elicit additional worker effort, they will 
find it profitable to design policies which influence employee lateness.   
 
In this paper we provide statistical evidence from a large, representative sample of British 
employees, the Employment in Britain survey, on the determinants of late arrival at work.  We 
address empirically two, largely distinct, characterisations of employee lateness from different 
theoretical literatures: economics and psychology.  In economics the preferences of 
individuals and the incentives and constraints they face are considered to govern how 
individuals use their time.  Lateness is therefore expected to respond to changes in employer 
policies which, say, better reward individual performance or punish transgressions more 
harshly.  Equally however, as the psychology literature emphasises, manifestations of a lack 
of work commitment, such as lateness, may reflect negative attitudes to the workplace or job 
in general. Low employee morale or a lack of job satisfaction may lead to late arrival at work.    
There is very little previous empirical work which attempts to evaluate the relative   4 
contributions of these two sets of potential determinants of lateness and this is the key 
contribution of the present study. 
 
By estimating generalised, multivariate, count data regression models of the frequency of 
worker lateness we demonstrate that there is an important role for both economic and 
psychological factors.  Lateness does respond in a predictable manner to both the incentives 
and sanctions in the workplace, however neglecting attitudinal variables such as job 
satisfaction leads to an incomplete view of the determinants of this particular aspect of worker 
commitment.  Our work suggests that employee morale, insofar as this is measured by job 
satisfaction, needs to be considered by firms, alongside the usual carrots and sticks of human 
resource management policy, when designing policies on employee lateness. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
existing theoretical and empirical literature, section 3 describes the data and econometric 
methodology, section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Models of Lateness 
There are two largely distinct perspectives on employee lateness in the scholarly literatures of 
economics and psychology.  Economists emphasise the preferences of, and constraints faced 
by, rational workers.  Arriving late at work is viewed as a choice taken after weighing up the 
costs and benefits of alternative uses of scarce time.  In contrast, researchers in industrial 
psychology focus on attitudes towards the workplace, particularly those relating to job 
satisfaction.  A key objective of our multivariate regression analysis is to evaluate the 
empirical relevance of each of these approaches hence in this section we provide an overview 
of each and discuss some existing empirical results.  The existing literature on lateness is   5 
relatively sparse and so we also refer to some studies which have analysed other aspects of 
worker commitment such as absenteeism, quits and work intensity or effort. 
 
The economic analysis of lateness, exemplified by Small (1982), posits a rational worker 
choosing a travel schedule which implies a target arrival time at work.  Arriving early, relative 
to an exogenous work start time, imposes a cost in terms of foregone leisure and is utility-
reducing.  This cost will be higher where workers value leisure more.  Arriving late implies 
two types of cost.  First, earnings may be reduced if pay is docked for late arrival.  Second, 
arriving late, like shirking in the efficiency wage model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), is likely 
to increase the probability of dismissal and therefore reduce the discounted flow of future 
earnings.  The choice of travel schedule, and hence expected arrival time at work, is therefore 
a tradeoff between the respective costs and benefits of early and late arrival.  
 
Factors which influence the costs and benefits of alternative expected arrival times fall into 
three broad groups.  First, the preferences of the worker will be important.  Those who value 
leisure more will, other things equal, prefer a later arrival time.  Second, the compensation 
structure faced by the worker will affect schedule choice.  This is potentially more complex 
than simply accounting for the foregone earnings which result from having pay docked for 
lateness.  For instance, higher earnings can imply a higher demand for leisure - an income 
effect as in the usual model of labour supply - and this will tend to increase the attractiveness 
of late arrival at work.  In addition, the potential motivational effects of incentive pay schemes 
need also to be considered: where performance-related rewards are offered this may improve 
all aspects of worker commitment.  The third set of economic determinants of lateness relates 
to the implications of late arrival for job security and tenure.  Both the probability of detection 
and the consequences of lateness will influence worker behaviour.  The structure of personnel   6 
policies including the effectiveness of monitoring within the firm and the strictness of 
sanctions for negative behaviour will influence the worker's decision. 
 
It is worth noting that the effects of incentives, monitoring effectiveness and sanctions have 
also been discussed in the economics literature as influences on other aspects of worker 
commitment.  In efficiency wage models (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) the probability of 
dismissal for shirking and the level of the wage are important in securing worker effort.  In 
models of interactions between principals (firms) and agents (workers), considerable attention 
is paid to designing incentive-compatible remuneration contracts under which agents will 
perform at a required level (Grossman and Hart, 1983).  Lazear (1995), in his review of the 
economics of personnel, shows how incremental pay schemes can bring forth high effort 
levels from employees.  Barmby et al. (1995) and Coles and Treble (1993) discuss how the 
design of personnel policies which reduce sick pay or offer bonuses for attendance may 
reduce absenteeism.  These examples suggest that in economics a common framework may be 
used to analyse lateness and other aspects of worker commitment. 
 
Psychological theories of employee lateness focus on the idea of 'withdrawal'.  It is argued 
that lateness is a withdrawal behaviour - a manifestation of "neglect and disrespect" 
(Koslowsky, 2000, p.391) - for the worker's job or employer.  Other types of withdrawal 
include shirking, absenteeism and voluntary separation and different withdrawal behaviours 
may be viewed as independent of one another, as substitutes or  as a progression.  This latter 
possibility, which has received some empirical support (Rosse and Miller, 1984), conjectures 
that withdrawal behaviours lie on a continuum with minor loafing at one end through lateness, 
serious shirking and absence, all the way up to turnover at the other.  As the degree of 
withdrawal increases, workers progress along the continuum exhibiting increasingly serious   7 
forms of malfeasance until a separation (voluntary or involuntary) occurs.  A key correlate of 
the worker's likelihood to withdraw from the workplace is job satisfaction.  Workers who are 
dissatisfied with aspects of the job are those, according to the theory, who are most likely to 
exhibit withdrawal behaviours, including lateness. 
 
From an empirical perspective, a number of psychological studies find a statistically 
significant correlation between lateness and attitudinal factors. Such investigations typically 
study a single employer or workplace and estimate simple correlations between lateness and 
other variables using relatively small samples.  Koslowsky et al. (1997) provide a useful 
survey of this literature by undertaking a meta-analysis of 118 correlation coefficients across 
30 samples from 27 independent studies.  The published studies used as inputs to the meta-
analysis had sample sizes ranging from 37 to 1,244 and were mainly conducted in single 
employers or workplaces.  The meta-analyis suggests that the strongest (positive) correlation 
was between lateness and other types of withdrawal behaviour including absence and 
turnover.  The next strongest correlation was a negative relationship between work attitudes -  
primarily job satisfaction - and lateness.  
 
A potentially important problem with such studies is that the estimation of simple correlation 
coefficients between two variables of interest fails to control for the wide variety of possible 
determinants of lateness.  If, for example, lateness is negatively related to pay which in turn is 
positively related to job satisfaction then an observed negative correlation between lateness 
and job satisfaction might simply be reflecting the influence of the omitted variable pay.  
Empirical work on lateness which attempts to control for this through multivariate regression 
techniques is rare.  One strand of relevant literature is found in the analysis of transportation 
choice and urban traffic congestion.  Here the focus is not on lateness per se but rather on the   8 
scheduling of (typically commuting) trips.  Implicit in a commuter's choice of transport mode 
and departure time is a probability of late arrival hence this literature provides some empirical 
evidence on the factors which influence the propensity to arrive at work after the required 
start time.   A key explanatory variable, in addition to the explicit cost of transport mode and 
journey time, turns out to be the degree of flexibility in arrival time enjoyed by the employee.  
Abkowitz (1981), Caplice and Mahmassani (1992) and Small (1982) find that employer 
flexibility is a statistically significant determinant of scheduling decisions taken by urban 
commuters in American cities.  This is consistent with the emphasis on monitoring and 
sanctions in the economic approach.  Small (1982) and Hendrickson and Plank (1984) find, in 
addition, that commuters generally prefer to arrive early for work rather than late - workers 
would pay considerably more to avoid being one minute late compared to one minute early. 
  
Transportation studies, in common with studies in industrial psychology, tend to be based on 
small samples of nationally non-representative workers.  Our data allow us to control for a 
wide variety of potential determinants of lateness using a representative sample of the British 
workforce.  The only similar study of which we are aware is by Leigh and Lust (1988) whose 
data are drawn from the United States Quality of Employment Survey and who use a Tobit 
regression model.   They find that significant determinants of the number of days reported late 
within the last two weeks (sign of relationship in parentheses) include: wages (+), working 
too much overtime (+), experiencing commuting problems  (+), work experience (-) and being 
a professional or managerial employee (+).  In contrast to many of the psychological studies, 
they find no role for job satisfaction once other variables are controlled for and no link 
between the frequency of lateness episodes and absenteeism.  
   9 
While there is no similar evidence on lateness for Britain, there is a recent empirical literature 
in economics on other aspects of worker commitment.  Green and McIntosh (1998) analyse 
subjective measures of work intensity or effort and emphasise the sanction of job loss for 
workers who are supplying low effort.  They find that the presence of trade unions is an 
important intervening variable which moderates the effect of the threat of job loss on effort.  
Clark (2001) estimates equations which explain the likelihood of workers quitting their jobs.  
In a panel of British workers, he finds a strong role for job satisfaction, after controlling for a 
large number of other variables including individual demographic characteristics, 
unionisation, region, industry and occupation.  Barmby et al. (2001) in a multivariate count 
data regression model find that sick pay generosity and hence the cost of absence are 
significant in explaining the number of absences in a particular manufacturing firm.  Our 
empirical evidence extends this approach to lateness and we now turn to a more detailed 
discussion of the data and econometric methods. 
 
3.  The Data and Econometric Model 
The  Employment in Britain  study surveyed the British labour market between May and 
September 1992. Postcode was used to generate a nationally-representative sample of 
employed and self-employed people aged between 20 and 60. A total of 3855 respondents 
were interviewed on a wide variety of issues relating to the respondent’s current employment 
position, employment history and to the characteristics of their employer, where appropriate. 
In addition, respondents were asked a set of questions designed to elicit subjective preferences 
and attitudes to various aspects of employment. A detailed sociological analysis of the data 
and further details of the sampling methodology are found in Gallie et al. (1998).  The sample 
used here was restricted to those respondents in full-time employment who reported their 
earnings.    10 
 
The dependent variable in our analysis refers to the number of times that the respondent 
reported being late in the previous month.  The possible responses and sample frequencies are 
tabulated for the regression sample in Table 1.  Around 70% of the sample reported that they 
had not been late at all in the previous month.  Amongst those with positive lateness count, 
once was the modal category with rapidly declining relative frequencies for the higher 
(grouped) counts.  Almost 2% reported being late eleven or more times which, assuming a 
standard five day working week, implies being late every other day, on average. 
 
It is possible to compute a rough estimate of the average probability that a worker will be late 
on any given day by using the relative frequencies and the midpoints of the grouped counts.  
Similar calculations based on the work of other researchers provide a check on whether our 
raw data are comparable.  Based on these 1897 workers from the  Employment in Britain 
survey, we find a value of 4.4%.  This is very similar to the value of 5.7% obtained by Leigh 
and Lust (1988) and 4.2% found by Small (1982) but is considerably smaller than the 12-16% 
reported by Koslowsky and Dishon-Berkovits (2001).  Note however that this latter paper 
examines a small sample (155) of white-collar employees only, while the other studies are 
based on larger samples and more heterogeneous workers.  
 
Like many studies of aspects of worker commitment we are using a dependent variable which 
is reported by the worker themselves.  Such data are potentially prone to problems of mis-
reporting or reporting bias.  Koslowsky and Dishon-Berkovits (2001) investigate the extent of 
mis-reporting of lateness episodes by comparing administrative records  from a large Israeli 
employer with employee self-reports of lateness.  They find that there was some under-
reporting in the self-report measures compared to the personnel records, however they   11 
describe the inaccuracy as "mild" (p. 157) and conclude that self-report data can be used in 
lieu of personnel data to study lateness.  
 
Our analysis is based on estimation of a generalisation of the Poisson regression model 
discussed in Moffatt and Peters (2000).  Here we provide the essence of the approach; more 
details of the technicalities of the model and estimation procedure are contained in Appendix 
A.  
 
Consider a discrete random variable  Yi representing the lateness count for individual  i.  
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where it is conventionally assumed that the Poisson mean depends on a vector of explanatory 
variables xi according to: 
  exp(') ii x l=b .    (2) 
Here b is a vector of parameters and the first element of the vector xi is a constant, so the first 
element of b is an intercept. 
 
Two features of the lateness data from the Employment in Britain survey require modification 
of the simple Poisson process presented above.  The first is that we do not observe the actual 
lateness count for some workers since the response to the question is grouped for the higher 
counts.  In fact, as the Appendix shows, a simple modification to the log-likelihood function 
can account for this.  It is also possible that the grouped nature of the dependent variable may 
have advantages from a sampling perspective by reducing potential mis-reporting problems at   12 
higher counts.  In other words, respondents who incorrectly recall the actual number of counts 
might still get it in the correct 'group' at high values of the dependent variable. 
 
The second feature of the data is common in the count data regression literature and is often 
called the 'excess zero' or 'zero inflation' problem.  This refers to the fact that a large 
proportion of the respondents, and importantly, a larger proportion than a simple Poisson 
process would predict, report zero instances of lateness during the relevant period.  Neglecting 
this can induce biased estimates and incorrect inferences (Winkelman, 1997, sections 3.3-3.4).  
To correct for this we assume that there are two types of worker.  The first type will never 
report a strictly positive lateness count which may reflect aspects of the worker's personal 
characteristics, honesty or the institutional arrangements at the workplace.  The second type is 
prone to lateness and may report a strictly positive count.  However they may also report a 
zero if they happen not to have been late in the reporting period.  Suppose that the population 
proportion of workers who are not prone to lateness is w, then (1) can be rewritten as: 
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where 1y=0 is a binary indicator variable which takes the value 1 when y = 0 and 0 otherwise. 
The proportion w can be treated as a parameter and estimated using standard maximum 
likelihood procedures.  
 
A final modification of the model is to let w vary with the observable characteristics of the 
respondent.  Blau (1994), using the administrative records of a bank and a hospital, reports 
that those who were never late over an 18-month period were significantly different on a 
number of characteristics to those who were late at least once.  This idea can be incorporated   13 
by specifying the following model for the individual probability of not being prone to 
lateness: 
  1(') ii w w=-Fg                 (4) 
where F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  In this formulation wi is a 
vector of explanatory variables (which may be the same as xi) thought to affect the likelihood 
that individual i is never late.  The vector g contains parameters which are to be estimated 
simultaneously with b.  The model based on equations (3) and (4) is known as the 
generalised, zero-inflated Poisson model. 
 
In the following section we report estimates of three different specifications of a generalised, 
grouped, zero-inflated Poisson regression model of lateness.  Specification I presents 
estimates of b and w on the assumption that w is  constant across individuals.  In Specification 
II we allow w to vary by observation requiring that we choose which explanatory variables 
enter into the vectors xi and wi. Initially we set wi = xi, our rationale being that theory offers 
little guidance in determining which variables should appear in the equation determining the 
count and which in the equation which models proneness to being late.  It is therefore an 
empirical matter and hence we estimate a second version of the generalised grouped zero-
inflated Poisson model (Specification III) which is obtained from Specification II through a 
stepwise variable elimination procedure. Specifically, we start with an initial set of variables 
and sequentially delete those that are least significant, using a 10% significance level as a cut-
off point.  This test is performed using the likelihood ratio criterion comparing the equations 
with and without the candidate variable(s).  
 
Table 2 contains a description of the initial set of explanatory variables in the regressions, 
along with some sample statistics and, for the dummy and ordinal variables, a statistical test   14 
of their association with lateness.  The variables have been divided into five broad categories 
which are discussed in turn below. 
 
(i) Worker Characteristics.  As is standard in much of labour economics, we control for age 
and its square, gender, education, marital status and household composition.  In the discussion 
of lateness, household structure is likely to be important.  The presence of young or school-
age children is expected to cause shocks to scheduling decisions and we include the numbers 
of infants and school-age children in our specification in order to capture these shocks. 
 
(ii) Workplace Characteristics.  We control for sector (private versus public) as there may be 
unobservable differences in the nature of the workers who choose each of these sectors which 
relate to their motivation and hence propensity to be late.  Industrial differences might also be 
expected to be important insofar as different technological processes necessitate different 
work-start time regimes.  Lanfranchi and Treble (2002) discuss the implications of the 
adoption of  just-in-time production processes for personnel policies related to absenteeism.  
The third characteristic we control for here is unionisation and we argue that this effect could 
work in either direction.  Unionised workers might feel a higher degree of protection from 
management discipline practices and hence exhibit higher lateness counts.  On the other hand, 
it has been suggested that unions can facilitate better employee-employer relations and 
contribute to productivity-enhancing improvements in worker commitment (Deery et al., 1999 
and references therein). 
 
(iii) Sanctions and Monitoring.  The EIB contains a number of measures of the strictness or 
otherwise of the supervisory and disciplinary environment in the workplace.  Particularly 
useful for our purposes is a question on the worker's perceptions of how long it would take   15 
them to be dismissed for persistent lateness.  This is self-reported, however it would seem that 
here it is the worker's perceptions which are actually important in determining his or her 
behaviour.  Assuming dismissal takes place, an aspect of the magnitude of the sanction is the 
expected time to re-employment elsewhere.  Thus we include the unemployment rate in the 
local travel-to-work area as a proxy for this effect.  Two other variables are included under 
this heading.  First, we have answers to a question on the worker's perceptions of whether 
punctuality is important to their supervisor.  Second, we include a variable reflecting whether 
the worker's employer requires that he or she sign or clock in to work. 
 
(iv)  Incentives.  In addition to the log of the hourly wage, we attempt to measure the impact 
of various aspects of incentive pay on the worker's punctuality.  We therefore include dummy 
variables reflecting whether the individual is subject to bonus payments for the quality of their 
(or their workgroup's) work, whether they are on an incremental pay scheme or whether there 
is some other performance-related aspect to their remuneration. 
 
(v)  Worker Attitudes.  Our main focus on worker attitudes relates to job satisfaction as has 
been emphasised by previous literature in both psychology and economics.  The question we 
use asked workers to rate their overall job satisfaction on a five point Likert-type scale.  In 
addition to job satisfaction, we also consider workers' attitudes to the statement: 'hard work is 
fulfilling in itself'.  We argue that responses to this reflect labour-leisure preferences and are 
likely to influence lateness behaviour through the perceived utility of additional leisure time. 
  
The final column of Table 2 demonstrates that there appears to be an individual association 
between a number of the discrete variables and the lateness variable at a significance level of 
10% or lower.  Particularly noticeable are the influences of time to dismissal, the importance   16 
of lateness to the supervisor, job satisfaction and attitudes to hard work.  However, due to 
strong association between certain of these variables themselves, and the need to control for 
the continuous variables, it is best to investigate the effects of these variables on lateness 
jointly.  
 
4.  Regression Results  
Table 3 contains maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the count data regression 
models.  Estimated coefficients and asymptotic t-statistics are presented for each of the three 
specifications discussed in the previous section.  For specification I the estimates of the 
parameter vector b are presented.  A positive coefficient in this column implies, ceteris 
paribus, that a unit increase in the relevant variable leads to a higher predicted lateness count. 
For each specification an estimate of the population proportion of workers who never report 
lateness is presented.  This is contained in the row labelled 'Probability of Zero Inflation' and 
corresponds to the parameter w.  In  specifications II and III the 'Inflation' column provides 
estimates of the parameter vector g.  Here a positive estimated coefficient implies that a unit 
increase in the relevant variable leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase in the probability that 
the worker is prone to lateness.  Interpretation of the 'Count' column for specifications II and 
III is the same as for specification I.   
 
In the ensuing discussion we focus primarily on specifications I and III, viewing specification 
II as an intermediate step, or bridge, between the two.  It is clear from perusal of the 
asymptotic t-statistics in specification II that a large number of the variables are insignificant 
and, for this reason, the more parsimonious specification III, resulting from our stepwise 
variable deletion procedure, is preferred.  Note that, based on likelihood ratio tests,   17 
specification II fits the data better than specification I (p-value < 0.001), while the more 
parsimonious specification III has a similar fit to specification II (p-value = 0.79).   
 
In specification I few of the background characteristics of the worker turn out to be 
statistically significant determinants of lateness.  The exceptions are gender, with males 
predicted to have higher counts, and educational qualifications, where the least well qualified 
exhibit lower counts.  Moving to specification III, however, demonstrates the importance of 
accounting for proneness to being late as well as lateness count, since a number of other 
individual worker characteristics become statistically significant.  For example, age reduces 
the probability of being prone to lateness.  This is similar to a finding of Leigh and Lust 
(1988) who use an experience variable in their regression model of lateness.  They interpret 
the negative sign as reflecting the greater job commitment of older and more experienced 
workers.  Interestingly,  marital status (the variable Spouse) is not significant in specification I 
but enters both equations in specification III but with opposite signs.  Thus being married 
increases the lateness count but is negatively related to the probability of being prone to 
lateness.  Labour economists (e.g. Polachek and Siebert, 1993, p. 84) discuss how marriage 
may be related to higher productivity through selection effects and one possible interpretation 
of our results is that married individuals are more committed and hence less prone to lateness, 
however those married people who are prone to lateness will be late more often than their 
single counterparts because of intra-household conflicts relating to the household's allocation 
of time.  Further evidence of the importance of intra-household allocation decisions comes 
from the coefficients on the variables relating to the presence of infant and school-age 
children in the household.  Children do significantly increase the probability of being prone to 
lateness which seems a reasonable finding.  
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The background characteristics of the workplace relating to industry, sector and unionisation 
are all highly significant.  Workers in manufacturing and the public sector exhibit less 
lateness.  These are broad aggregations of types of employer and workplace so any 
explanation for these findings is necessarily speculative.  It is possible however that the nature 
of the production process in manufacturing will imply a stricter requirement that the various 
parts of an integrated production process are synchronised in time.  This, essentially 
technological, reason could explain why there is a greater culture of punctuality in 
manufacturing as opposed to services.  We also speculate that public sector workers are more 
likely to have chosen their vocations for non-pecuniary reasons and will display, as a result, 
higher work commitment and hence less lateness.   
 
In these data, controlling for other factors, unionised workers report significantly lower counts 
than non-unionised workers. The sign of the unionisation coefficient is difficult to predict a 
priori.  On the one hand, unionised workers may feel protected against the sanctions which 
are available to employers for negative work behaviour.  Green and McIntosh (1998) find 
evidence in support of this view in a study of worker effort levels.  On the other hand, unions 
are often credited with acting as a communications channel between management and 
employees in which role they boost morale and increase worker commitment.  For example, 
Deery et al. (1999) find that a positive union-management relationship is associated with 
higher levels of attendance in an Australian automotive manufacturer.  While it is not the 
principal theme of our paper, our results support this latter view of the effect of unionisation 
on one particular aspect of worker commitment in a cross-section of the British labour force. 
 
Monetary incentives are a key component of the economic analysis of worker commitment 
and our regression results provide some detail on the mechanism of how such payments affect   19 
punctuality.  The (log) hourly wage is negatively signed and significant at the 10% level in 
specification I.  This is the opposite sign to that found by Leigh and Lust (1988) however 
those authors note that if pay is docked for tardiness, then a higher wage implies a higher 
opportunity cost of time late for work hence the wage variable is difficult to sign a priori.  
Note also that the log wage is only of marginal significance and in fact drops out of the model 
when we move to specification III.  On the other hand, individuals who are eligible for an 
individual performance bonus are predicted to have lower lateness counts in both 
specifications I and III.  We found no role in determining individual lateness behaviour for 
bonuses which are paid for the performance of a higher level structure such as a workgroup or 
plant nor was there any effect of profit sharing or performance related pay.   In specification 
III we also found that being on an incremental pay scale increased the likelihood that a worker 
was prone to lateness, while at the same time reducing the lateness count.  To the extent that 
an incremental pay scheme reflects a rising real earnings-age profile, theory (reviewed in 
Lazear, 1995, chapter 4) suggests that such reward schemes should induce increased worker 
effort, and hence by extrapolation, reduce levels of lateness.  For those workers who are prone 
to lateness, this view is consistent with our results.  However, being on such a pay scheme is 
also associated with a reduced probability of being prone to lateness.  Further investigation of  
this finding would require more detailed information on the slope of the pay-experience 
profile, the particular point on the incremental scale currently reached  by the worker and the 
conditions attached to salary progression.  Such information is not generally available in 
large-scale survey data and personnel records are required for such purposes. 
 
As well as financial inducements, economics suggests that rational workers' behaviour will 
respond to the monitoring and disciplinary environment in the firm.  Nationally representative 
survey data do not generally allow detailed investigation of this environment and it is a   20 
strength of the Employment in Britain survey that workers were asked about their perceptions 
of the monitoring and sanctions that they face.  Our regression results confirm the importance 
of these variables as key determinants of lateness.  Unsurprisingly, workers whose supervisors 
viewed punctuality as important reported lower lateness counts and those required to clock or 
sign in were less prone to lateness.  Similarly, perceptions of the time to dismissal for 
persistent lateness were highly significant.  Relative to the baseline of dismissal between one 
month and one year, a longer time to dismissal is (monotonically) associated with more 
lateness.  We should, however, note at this stage that a relatively large proportion of our 
sample did not report the time to dismissal.  Rather than drop these observations we included 
a dummy variable to capture these workers.  The positive sign on this variable could be 
interpreted in the following way: those who are insufficiently motivated to find out about their 
company's policies towards negative work behaviours are demonstrating low work 
commitment and hence are more likely to exhibit such behaviours.   
 
The only sanctions and monitoring variable which was not a significant determinant of 
lateness was the local unemployment rate.  This was included in the initial model on the basis 
that, in line with efficiency wage type models (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), a larger pool of 
unemployed labour increases the incentives not to shirk since dismissal is more costly to the 
worker.  In models of employee effort, Agell (1994) and Belman et al. (1992) use subjective 
measures of the likelihood of job loss as explanatory variables and find that the greater is this 
likelihood then the lower is the level of shirking.  A potential explanation for our finding is 
therefore that the local unemployment rate is a poor proxy for any individual’s subjective 
assessment of the probability of them finding themselves out of work and it is this latter 
measure which is important in affecting worker motivation. 
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To summarise the results of our discussion of the various carrots and sticks that are available 
to employers, it is clear that the structure of remuneration and, particularly, the supervisory 
and monitoring environment and the perceived punishments for transgression have a major 
influence on the likelihood that workers will be late and the frequency of lateness episodes.  
Employment policies in the workplace can, in principle, influence worker behaviour over 
lateness in the manner that a simple economic model might predict.  One other aspect of any 
economic model of worker behaviour is preferences and we have argued that the strength of a 
worker's preferences for leisure will be important in determining lateness.  Such preferences 
are not usually observed; our proxy is the strength of the worker's agreement with the 
statement that hard work is fulfilling in itself.  Table 3 reveals that this variable is completely 
insignificant, a finding at odds with Clark and Tomlinson (2001), who use these data to 
analyse self-reported effort levels. 
 
Worker attitudes are less directly controllable by employers, although employment practices 
and policies will impact upon them at some level.  Attitudes to the job, as the psychological 
and economic studies discussed earlier make clear, are associated with aspects of worker 
behaviour and one of our key research questions is whether, controlling for other variables, 
attitudes relating to job satisfaction affect lateness.  From specification I the answer is 
affirmative.  Those who report being completely or very satisfied are less frequently late than 
those who feel neutral about their job.  The dissatisfied are more likely to be late than the 
baseline group although this latter effect is not statistically significant.   This finding is echoed 
in the inflation equation of specification III suggesting that job satisfaction works through 
affecting the probability that an individual is prone to lateness.  Job satisfaction, in fact, 
appears in both equations in specification III although its status in the count equation is 
marginal.  Indeed if we changed our criterion for variable elimination to 5% then job   22 
satisfaction would drop out of the count equation (it would however remain in the other 
equation).   
 
We have already discussed how smaller scale studies in individual workplaces suggest a link 
between job satisfaction and lateness.  We believe that our finding represents an important 
advance insofar as we demonstrate that, even after controlling for a wide variety of other 
variables in a representative sample of British employees, there is a negative association 
between a worker's overall satisfaction with their job and their proneness to being late.  The 
influence of job satisfaction on a variety of outcomes is increasingly being recognised and our 
results support the view (e.g. Clark, 1996, 2001) that the analysis of such subjective measures 
is a valid area of study for labour economists and industrial relations researchers.  We would 
go further and suggest that neglecting the importance of job satisfaction yields a restrictive 
view of how worker behaviour is determined.  The quantitative significance of this is 
demonstrated in Table 4 where we calculate predicted monthly lateness counts, based on the 
results of specification III, for a variety of worker and workplace types.  We vary the 
sanctions (‘sticks’) and incentives (‘carrots’) faced by workers, as well as their level of job 
satisfaction. 
 
Moving from a position where the individual is ‘fairly satisfied or neutral’ about their job to a 
position where they are ‘completely satisfied’ reduces the predicted probability that an 
individual is prone to lateness by around twenty percentage points (from 0.52 to 0.31) and the 
expected monthly lateness count from 0.98 to 0.60.  This reduction in the expected count is 
larger than the individual effects of increased sanctions (the + Sticks type where monitoring is 
increased and the time to dismissal for persistent lateness falls) or increased incentives (the + 
Carrots type where performance bonuses and incremental pay schemes are offered).  Unlike   23 
sanctions and incentives, job satisfaction is by no means fully under the control of the 
employer, nevertheless our results demonstrate that changes in job satisfaction can have a 
quantitatively important impact on behavioural outcomes in the workplace. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Our investigation of the factors which determine the frequency of employee lateness was 
motivated by arguments from economics and psychology.  The regression results suggest that 
economic variables relating to the incentives and sanctions facing workers as well as 
psychological or attitudinal variables relating to job satisfaction are important.  The 
implication is that focussing on one set of explanations at the expense of the other yields an 
incomplete view of lateness.  Such a finding contributes to a wider development in the 
economics literature in which self-reported, subjective, psychological measures of various 
phenomena appear centre stage.  Examples include the analysis of happiness by Oswald 
(1997), job satisfaction by Clark (1996, 2001) and firm financial performance by Machin and 
Stewart (1990). 
 
From the employer's perspective, our results point to a trade-off facing by those who set 
personnel policy.  A stricter working environment, in terms of the supervision and monitoring 
of the worker, will secure reduced lateness, but may well create a less pleasant working 
environment, poorer relations between management and workers, lower job satisfaction, more 
lateness and potentially other withdrawal behaviours.  The slope of this trade-off together 
with the nature of the firm's personnel and remuneration policies are the ingredients of a cost-
benefit exercise which firms will undertake in order to establish the optimal way of securing a 
given level of lateness.   24 
 
Lateness is relatively under-researched in the industrial relations and economics literatures 
and additional insight could be gained from the analysis of employer’s personnel data.  Not 
only would this deal with potential problems of self-reporting, but would provide a much 
more detailed view of the micro-structure of policies relating to incentives and sanctions 
within the workplace.  The analysis of such data, which would complement the use of large 
survey data sets as in the current paper, is an agenda for future research. 
 
The precise relationship between different aspects of worker commitment and types of 
withdrawal is another question which needs to be addressed.  The importance of lateness for 
firms and the wider economy will depend on whether it is a precursor to or correlate of other 
productivity-reducing worker behaviours such as absenteeism and shirking, or whether it is an 
isolated form of worker malfeasance.   25 
Appendix A - The Econometric Model and Estimation Procedure 
 
We begin from the standard Poisson probability model 













  (A1) 
where  Yi is a discrete random variable representing the count for individual  i  and
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To account for grouping, the set of non-negative integers is partitioned into  J mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive subsets I1,...,IJ, such that each  Ij is the set of consecutive integers {aj 
, aj+1, ..., bj}, with a1 = 0, aj+1 = bj + 1 for j = 1,2,..., J-1, and bJ = ¥.  The way in which the 
lateness question was asked results in knowledge of the set Ij to which the count belongs, but 
not the count itself.  The probability of individual i being in group j is: 
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 Let yi be the realisation of the random variable Yi.  We define an indicator dij to take the value 
one if  yi ˛ Ij , and zero otherwise.  Although the y’s are not fully observable, the d’s are, and 
the log-likelihood function for a sample of size n may be constructed as follows: 
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The final group, group  J, consists of an infinite number of integers:  aJ ,  aJ+1, ..,  ¥.  The 
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i j x P b  in order for its evaluation to be possible. 
The grouped zero-inflated Poisson  model is defined as follows:   26 
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where  wi  = 1  "  i and  F(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
Alternatively  wi can be defined as a vector of characteristics of individual  i which are relevant 
to the whether the individual will ever report positive incidences of lateness at all, and a is a 
corresponding vector of parameters, the first of which is an intercept, The set of variables 
contained in  wi, the set of variables which determine whether the individual is prone to 
lateness, may overlap partly or completely with the set of variables in  xi, which, as previously, 
are assumed to determine frequency through the terms P j(xi ; b) which were defined in (A3).  
This latter characterisation is labelled the generalised grouped zero-inflated Poisson model. 
 
The parameter estimates can be found by optimising the log-likelihood function (A4) using an 
appropriate method. In the current study, a full Newton method was used and the Hessian at 
the solution was used to calculate the covariance matrix estimate from which standard errors 
are extracted. The average probability of being prone to lateness can be calculated as 






, with its standard error obtained via the delta method.  In the regression results 
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Table 1 The Dependent Variable: Lateness  
How often late  Frequency  Relative Frequency (%) 
Never  1337  70.5 
Once  250  13.2 
Twice  147  7.8 
3-5 times  103  5.4 
6-10 times  27  1.4 
More than 11 times  33  1.7 
 
Note: The table summarises responses to a question on how often the respondent was late in the 
previous month.   28 
Table 2 Explanatory Variables for the Regression Sample 
Variable   Description  Frequency/Descriptive  Associated with 
Lateness? 
Employee Characteristics 
Age  Age in years   Median: 35 
Range: 20-60 
- 
Agesq/100  Age squared, rescaled  -  - 
Male  Respondent is male  62.5%  0.529 
Spouse  Respondent is living with 
a spouse or partner 




High: degree or 
equivalent; Intermediate: 
A Levels or equivalent; 







Infants  Number of children aged 








Number of children aged 







Public sector  Employer is in public 
sector 
35.0%  0.016 
Manufacturing  Employer is in 
manufacturing, broadly 
defined. 
35.7%  0.494 
Union  Respondent is a member 
of a trade union 
recognised in the 
workplace 
43.5%  0.001   29 




Logarithm of gross 
hourly earnings 
Mean: 1.80 
Standard Deviation: 0.53 
- 
Bonus1  Individual eligible for 
bonus payments for 




BonusO  Individual eligible for 
bonus for quality of 
collective work 
(workgroup or plant) 
28.6%  0.991 
Incremental 
Pay Scale 
Respondent is on 
incremental pay scale 
42.4%  0.246 
Other Pay 
Incentives 
Respondent is a member 
of a profit sharing 
scheme or has 
performance related pay. 
47.8%  0.533 




How much importance 
the respondent perceives 
that their supervisor 
places on punctuality 
1. Great deal: 57.3% 
2. Some: 28.0% 
3. Little or None: 14.7% 
 
0.000 
Clock  Respondent is required to 







Unemployment rate (%) 
in the travel to work area. 




Worker's perceptions of 
time to dismissal for 
persistent lateness. 
Less than 1 month: 26.7% 
6 months - 1 year: 44.7% 
More than 1 year: 9.5% 
Never: 8.9% 




Job satisfaction  Overall satisfaction with 
job 
1. Completely: 13.5% 
2. Very: 33.2% 
3. Fairly or Neutral: 44.8% 
4. Dissatisfied: 8.2% 
0.000 
Work attitude  Agree with statement: 
hard work is fulfilling in 
itself 
1. Agree strongly: 23.6% 
2. Agree somewhat: 50.9% 
3. Neutral: 16.2% 
4. Disagree: 8.8% 
0.001 
 
Note:  The final column of this table reports a p-value for the null hypothesis of no association 
between the relevant categorical variable and lateness.  This is the standard Pearson c
2 test. 
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Table 3: Regression Results  
 




  Count  Inflation  Count  Inflation   Count 
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-  0.1351 
(1.972)** 


























-  -0.0537 
(0.6115) 






-  -0.2940 
(2.438)** 


































-  -0.2563 
(3.627)** 






-  -0.3681 
(5.088)** 
Incentives 






-  - 






-  -0.2042 
(2.388)** 



























-  - 
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Table 3 Continued 
 



















-  0.4335 
(5.155)** 



















-  - 
Dismissal for lateness:   






-  -0.2226 
(2.536)** 








-  0.4409 
(4.428)** 






-  0.8424 
(9.900)** 






-  0.3635 
(2.981)** 
Worker Attitude 






































-  - 






-  - 






-  - 









       
Log likelihood  -2020.52  -1973.79  -1987.42 
Observations  1897  1897  1897 
 
Notes:  
1)  For variable descriptions refer to table 2. The table entries for the explanatory variables contain the 
coefficient estimate with their asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. Those tagged with * are significant 
between the 10% and  5% level, those with ** at the 5% level or below. 
 
2)  Baseline categories for dummy variables: female, unmarried, low qualifications, not unionised, not 
employed in the public or broad manufacturing sectors, time to dismissal between a month and less than a 
year, no pay incentives, no clocking-on, strict monitoring of late arrival, fairly satisfied or neutral about the 
job, agrees somewhat that hard work is fulfilling in itself.   32 
Table 4: Predicted Probabilites and Expected Counts 
Type  Pr(late)  Expected Lateness Count 
Baseline  0.52  0.98 
+ No Sticks  0.52  3.53 
+ Sticks  0.45  0.68 
+ Carrots  0.58  0.72 
+ Carrots & Sticks  0.51  0.51 
+ Satisfied  0.31  0.60 
Notes: 
The Baseline individual is 35 years old and has the characteristics defined by the excluded 
dummy variable categories in the equations reported in Table 3, namely: female, unmarried, 
low qualifications, not unionised, not employed in the public or broad manufacturing sectors, 
time to dismissal between a month and less than a year, no pay incentives, no clocking-on, 
strict monitoring of late arrival, fairly satisfied or neutral about the job, agrees somewhat that 
hard work is fulfilling in itself.  The other types alter the Baseline type in the following 
manner: 
+ No Sticks  is where lateness is of little or no importance to the worker’s supervisor and 
where the worker will never be dismissed for persistent lateness. 
+ Sticks is where the worker is required to clock or sign in and will be dismissed within one 
month for persistent lateness. 
+ Carrots is where the individual is on an incremental pay scheme and receives some kind of 
performance pay bonus. 
+ Satisfied is where the individual reports being completely satisfied with his/her job. 
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